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Introduction:
Say you are splitting a cookie with a friend, and want to divide it fairly. How do you go
about solving this problem? Perhaps you split it in a way that you consider to be half, and your
friend chooses the side they want. Seems fair. But what if your friend had just had three cookies,
and this was your first cookie of the day. Should you still split the cookie in half? What
constitutes a ‘fair’ way to spit the cookie then? While this exact instance may seem like a silly
example, thought experiments like these may be helpful to question larger issues of distributive
justice.
In philosophy, distributive justice is the economic, political, and social structure that
constitute a larger debate on how resources should be divided in society. What is a ‘fair’ way of
distributing resources? Many philosophers have created different frameworks that attempt to
answer this question. Egalitarianism, prioritarianism and sufficientarianism are three such
frameworks that each that a different approach with different priorities to answering the question.
Egalitarianism focuses on equality and making sure everyone has an equal amount of resources.
Prioritarianism prioritizes those least well-off, and making sure they can be brought up to the
level of well-being of those better off. Sufficientarianism concentrates on sufficiency, and
making sure everyone has enough, so that no one is in poverty. This paper will introduce ideas
from egalitarianism and prioritarianism before focusing on sufficientarianism.
In Chapter One, I will present ideas from egalitarianism and prioritarianism, and then
show how sufficientarianism came to be a theory of distributive justice from critiques of these
theories, looking to Harry Frankfurt as the modern day father of sufficientarianism. He will
respond to egalitarians as to why equality is not intrinsically valuable, and why we should focus
on something more tangible, poverty. Then, I will introduce Roger Crisp who will flesh out the
1

theory a bit more, and give us some variants on sufficientarianism. Finally, in Chapter One,
Paula Casal will voice her objections to Frankfurt’s and Crisps’ sufficientarianism, and why it
cannot stand alone as a theory of distributive justice.
In Chapter Two, I will reconsider Frankfurt’s logic for creating sufficientarianism, and
create a slightly altered theory of my own sufficientarianism based on these roots. This I will
deem to be the best version of sufficientarianism to take on Casal’s objections.
Lastly, in Chapter Three, I will contemplate the implications of the new theory I have
created, and what exactly they mean for Casal’s objections. Additionally, I will explore the
possibilities of new problems that have arisen from the new theory, and respond to those.

2

Chapter 1: The First Attempt at Sufficientarianism

Egalitarianism is a theory of distributive justice that favors equality. The theory stems
from the idea that everyone deserves an equal share of resources in order to be treated equally.
Equality usually indicates a relationship between two people. Egalitarians typically believe that
if one person has more resources than another, then the relationship cannot be equal. Like every
concept, equality either is or is not intrinsically valuable; that is equality has some value for its
own sake or it derives value from something else. Parfit distinguishes with this idea with two
different types of egalitarian positions: telic-egalitarians and deontic-egalitarians. Telicegalitarians agree with the idea that equality is intrinsically valuable while deontic-egalitarians
praise equality for its instrumental value, and condemn inequality when inequality creates further
moral consequence.
If we believe that equality is intrinsically valuable (and are telic-egalitarians), Parfit
argues we must always find something positive about a state in which everything is equal. This
includes cases when everyone’s utility is lowered to the lowest level. Since we have made
everything equal, there must be some benefit. While telic-egalitarians may be pluralists who care
for things other than just equality, they may admit that such a “level-down” move would be
overall bad even though it does do some good in creating equality. If we are to disagree with
telic-egalitarians, we must disagree completely that leveling down does any good (hence, Parfit
will coin this as the Leveling Down objection). Parfit contends that leveling down is completely
bad because it does nothing to benefit those who are worse off. If we have created a situation in
which everyone is worse off purely for the purpose of equality, those who are the absolute worse
off are no better off because of it. Therefore, deontic-egalitarians escape this Leveling-Down
3

objection because there is no moral reason that everyone should be brought to the same low level
since equality is only instrumentally useful.
We might be tempted to become deontic-egalitarians, but Parfit advises against it. He
proposes a case in which there are two worlds that have no idea of the other’s existence.
(1) In world 1, people have utility level 100, and in the other world, people have utility level 200
(2) Everyone is at utility level 145 in both worlds
If we are deontic-egalitarians, we cannot make a claim against the first situation because
there was no “wrong-doing, there is no injustice”1. Saying situation 2 is better as a deonticegalitarians claim as an egalitarian that there must still be something valuable in equality, and we
should then become telic-egalitarians. Instead, Parfit proposes a third option, seeing the need to
help the people of the lowest level of utility, giving them priority when possible. This view,
which he calls The Priority View, believes that benefiting those who are the worst off matters the
most. The Priority View births the second theory of distributive justice which is known as
prioritarianism. Prioritarianism argues that we value the increase for someone lower in resources
more than those who have more resources. The same level increase for a person at a lower level
is weighted more heavily than a person at a higher level. However, Parfit makes it clear that this
type of comparison is not a relational view. While there is in some sense that benefiting me is
good “because I am worse off than you”, but it is also good just because I have a low level of
utility, and need to be prioritized2. Prioritarians are concerned with absolute levels rather than
relatives like egalitarians3.
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The last theory of distributive justice, in this paper, sufficientarianism argues that people
are entitled to a life above some threshold. Sufficientarians favor a system of justice where
everyone can secure ‘enough’ and typically reject the idea that equality is intrinsically valuable.
Frankfurt, who usually is thought of as the father of modern day sufficientarianism, sums up this
idea by stating “what is important from the point of view of morality is not that everyone should
have the same but that each should have enough”4.
In Frankfurt’s mind, poverty and greater suffering are the true problems rather than
inequality. We have a duty to help those who are worse off, but distributive problems stem from
the fact that some people have far too little and must live in impoverished conditions while
others have far greater comforts and influence. If we are to redistribute materials, then it is likely
this may “entail a reduction in inequality” 5. However, equality should not be the goal. To figure
why, Frankfurt imagines a scenario where everyone has economically the same, but far from a
sufficient amount. We could easily create such a scenario by taking away resources from every
individual until they are matched with the poorest person. This would not make anyone better
off, but it would create equality (this is the same as the Leveling Objection from before). Thus,
Frankfurt argues that equality is not a persuasive end goal – people could easily be equal and still
be impoverished. Rather, we should set our sights on ensuring that everyone has enough; if
people have more than enough or if the distribution is unequal, so long as everyone has enough,
this isn’t of much concern. This argument propels Frankfurt’s Doctrine of Sufficiency, which
states that ideally, all people have to meet some standard of living for them to be content. By

4
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concentrating on making sure everyone meets the threshold of sufficiency, likely goods will be
redistributed in the process from those with excessive wealth above the line of sufficiency.
Frankfurt argues that, at times, equality can be disastrous when it comes to distributing
goods. Imagine we have a population of ten sickly people, and there are forty units of critical,
life-saving medication. In order to survive, each person needs eight doses of the medicine. If
distributed equally, each person will get four units of medicine, and everyone will die. In such
cases of “exigent scarcity”, when not everyone can meet the sufficiency threshold “the
desirability of an egalitarian distribution may be quite out of the question” 6. In this case,
distributing things equally doesn’t benefit anybody. No one is better off with four doses of
medicine. Instead, we should promote sufficientarian principles that ensure that at least some
people will meet the sufficiency threshold.
But what is enough by Frankfurt’s definition? Frankfurt argues a line of sufficiency has
been reached when people are satisfied with what they have, or when any reasonable person
would be content with the amount that they have been given. By Frankfurt’s own admission, “it
is far from self-evident precisely what the doctrine of sufficiency means” 7. In simpler words, the
threshold for sufficiency is incredibly vague. While it would seem standard is at least somewhat
high as one has to have ‘enough’ which implies some level of contentment, there isn’t a set line
where one can definitely know where sufficiency is. The ambiguity of his threshold in
Frankfurt’s opinion “is hardly a good reason for adopting” egalitarianism 8. Compare
sufficientarianism to egalitarianism, it may be much easier to calculate if people have the same
resources. However, just because it is easier to have a measure for a theory of distributive justice
6
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does not make it more ‘right’. We could give everyone exactly one unit of every resource for an
exact measurement, but this would be a terrible theory of distributive justice because it would not
do anything to ensure that anyone has enough.
Frankfurt is not the only proponent of sufficientarianism that deals with the ambiguity in
setting a sufficiency threshold. Crisp, another sufficientarian, also cannot define a hard threshold
for the theory, arguing that we should seek to use compassion as a key metric in understanding
what distributive justice requires in setting the sufficiency line. Since everyone may have
completely different levels of compassion, Crisp advocates for the use of an average impartial
spectator to be the judge. Whereas, Frankfurt had reasoned sufficiency was met once distributing
more stuff to the person wouldn’t (or reasonably shouldn’t) remove any discontentment, Crisp
upholds a slightly lower line of sufficiency since his threshold is crossed when an average
impartial spectator no longer feels compassion.
However, compassion is not alone in measuring Crisp’s sufficiency threshold as he also
believes that considerations of deservingness should be taken into our understanding of
compassion. An impartial spectator is used to “track the claims of justice” and in cases where
someone is below the sufficiency threshold because of their own fault, likely the spectator would
feel less compassion for that person9. The person who now suffers may not be deserving of the
harm, and should be brought up to the threshold, but the person is also less deserving of help
than someone suffering through no fault of their own. While Frankfurt’s main concern is that
individuals are brought up to the line of sufficiency, Crisp believes that prioritarian
considerations have some weight below this threshold. The reason for this consideration still
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stems from compassion as Crisp believes that “our compassion may call for special concern for
the worse off”10. We feel the most compassion for those who are the worst off because they are
suffering the most. As a result, we should help the people furthest from the threshold first.
Crisp also differs in how he distributes goods above the line of sufficiency compared to
Frankfurt. While Frankfurt just cares that everyone hit his threshold, Crisp thinks that there are
some additional considerations after the line of sufficiency. Above the line, Crisp believes that
we should distribute goods to whoever benefits the most from the additional units. If our choices
are between giving between the rich and the super-rich, it may be best to give to the super rich if
they benefit more than the rich from the extra units. Since everyone has enough to meet their
basic needs with some comfort, Crisp thinks that we should consider who gets the most utility
from each distribution of each good. The person getting the goods will then be the person who
benefits the most from those goods.
To illustrate this, Crisp uses a case (the ‘Beverly Hills case’) where there is a choice
between giving wine to 10 Rich individuals or 10,000 Super-rich individuals. If we give the wine
to the 10 rich people, they will increase their utility from a level of 80 to 82, and if we give it to
the 10,000 super rich people they will have a raise of level 90 to 92. Since both groups have
surpassed the line of sufficiency, it would seem absurd to get into the minute details of who gets
the wine. Neither group needs compassion, so priority is not given to either group. Instead,
utilitarian considerations come into play because both groups are well-off enough. The wine
would be distributed to the super-rich group where it would increase the total utility the most.

10
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After the articles of Frankfurt and Crisp which promote sufficientarianism, Paula Casal
inspects their arguments, and assesses how sufficientarian “principles could play within
distributive ethics in supplementing rather than replacing principles of equality and priority”

11

.

In her own article, Casal picks out what she believes are the strongest arguments for
sufficientarianism from Frankfurt and Crisp. This leads her to have a large overarching argument
in which she has sub-arguments in which she points out problems for sufficientarianism alone as
a distributive justice theory. Casal makes a cumulative case for her theory by offering a series of
sub-arguments in favor of it and a series of critiques of the rival accounts. Thus, it should be
noted that all of her sub-arguments are working towards a larger goal in which Casal concludes
on her own distributive justice theory, and comes to this conclusion through inference to the best
explanation. For brevity’s sake, I will pick out what I consider to be the most interesting of
Casal’s sub-arguments.
One of the first things Casal does is breaks down the sufficientarian theory into two
theses:
The Positive Thesis: it should be stressed that “people live above a certain threshold, free
from deprivation”12.
The Negative Thesis: There are no additional, prioritarian or egalitarian distributive
requirements above a given threshold.
Casal accepts the positive thesis of sufficientarianism. She states that “few deny that the
elimination of certain types of deprivation, such as hunger, disease, and ignorance, are very
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weighty political requirements”13. Having some sort of positive thesis, in her mind, is a given.
However, she rejects the negative thesis idea that once sufficiency has been reached there are no
more distributive requirements. Casal sees a problem with the idea that “when everyone has
enough, it does not matter how unequally additional resources are distributed” 14.
One of her main problems with sufficientarianism is arguments focused on abundance.
Frankfurt, in particular, argues that once sufficiency has been reached inequalities among those
above the threshold are inconsequential to matters of greater suffering. In particular, Casal uses
Crisp’s Beverly Hills case to illustrate some critiques of abundance while showcasing why she
believes it is a poor example.
Crisp had argued that whether the rich or the super-rich were benefited in the Beverly
Hills case seemed inconsequential, and Casal notes that the example used by Crisp is
intentionally misleading. The two groups that were to potentially benefit were at the highest
levels, and the benefit itself, wine, was trivial. If instead, Crisp had an example with “lifechanging benefits”, Casal argues that the results would have been very different 15. Imagine a
situation where two groups, a super-rich group and a group just barely above a threshold, could
be given with this sort of benefit. One possible example is a hospital that has just received a
“fantastic donation, which includes spare rooms for visitors, delicious meals, and the best in
world cinema”16. It can either go to the super rich group or the group just above the sufficiency
threshold. Since both groups have met the threshold requirements, it would seem that there is no
reason to prefer one over the other. So if hospital administers were to “arbitrarily decide to
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devote all those luxuries to just a few fortunate beneficiaries, their decision would be unfair” 17.
Issues of justice are still arising when a preference is given for those who are so much better than
those who are barely meeting the sufficiency threshold. While both groups may be sufficiently
well off, one is obviously still much better off, so there still needs to be some justice when it
comes to distribution. The intuition that inequalities are important even past a threshold is
counterintuitive to sufficientarian principles. Sufficientarianism would leave us indifferent to
how these goods were distributed because inequalities do not matter past the line of sufficiency.
Below the line of sufficiency, Casal also sees potential problems when it comes to
distribution. These types of problems are problems of scarcity; problems for when not enough
resources exist to get everyone to the sufficiency threshold. While the positive thesis establishes
a basis for getting everyone above the line of sufficiency, it fails to establish how we should
distribute when “not everyone can have enough”18. If we have medicine that “does not prevent
death but merely makes death less painful”, “it would be unfair if all the pain-relieving medicine
was distributed to the fortunate few” 19. This medicine would not “secure sufficiency”, yet it
would seem that distributing it all to one person or distributing it such that some are more likely
to be the “fortunate few”20. It would seem that we would want to maximize the number of people
who are as well off as possible even if sufficiency can’t be achieved. Yet, under sufficientarian
principles, there is no reason to distribute things equally since no one will achieve sufficiency.
When sufficiency can be achieved for some below the threshold, but only if things are
divided unequally, Casal argues that equality is still a valuable concept. In Frankfurt’s example

17
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where there is only “enough medicine to save only five of ten patients”, Frankfurt assumes that
an egalitarian would favor an equal distribution of resources even when it leads to the death of
all the patients21. However, the egalitarian position is not committed to distributing resources
equally means everyone is just as bad off. Rather, egalitarians must find some way to distribute
benefits in a way that “satisfies each individual’s equal claim to be benefited, that is, by giving
everybody an equal chance” at sufficiency22. If instead of medicine, the resource in question was
the Mona Lisa, egalitarians wouldn’t shred the painting into ten different pieces, but find some
way to fairly distribute rather than destroy the resource. The egalitarian view allows for
sufficiency, but also distributes the resources in a fair way. Under Frankfurt’s view, we can
prefer certain individuals because all that matters is securing sufficiency.
The drive to secure sufficiency can be problematic as it may prioritize certain individuals
over others. If one accepts both the positive and the negative thesis, then it is possible to imagine
a situation where there are a limited amount of resources and only some people who already have
more can get to sufficiency. Casal illustrates this kind of example using three individuals, Ana,
Bea and Celia, all in need of surgery. Ana has lived a horrible life and despite the prospect of
surgery, it is determined she will never reach sufficiency. While Bea and Celia have both lived
sufficiently good lives, Celia has had a much more comfortable life. Thus arises the question of
how sufficientarianism measures success. Ana will never reach sufficiency even with the
surgery, so giving her more resources may seem pointless especially to someone like Frankfurt
who seems to emphasize the importance of people being able to reach the sufficiency threshold.
Giving the resources to Bea over Celia may signal a preference for valuing those at lower levels

21
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of resources which sufficientarians reject above a threshold. Casal leaves us with these question
from sufficientarianism: what do we ultimately care about? If we just care about the sufficiency
threshold, sufficientarians may be quick to write off people who cannot reach the sufficiency
threshold, disregarding them. As a result, sufficientarianism becomes about how many people
can reach sufficiency even if some people have to suffer with incredibly low levels of goods as a
result of such policies. If we care about poverty, it would seem we have to incorporate some
prioritarian considerations even if people can’t reach a threshold at all.
Casal does ultimately agree with the positive thesis, and that there should be some
“guaranteed social minimum”23. Yet, she believes that the negative thesis fails, and that
sufficientarianism on its own is not enough. As a result, sufficiency should be used to
“supplement rather than replace equality and priority” 24. From her objections of
sufficientarianism, she comes to the conclusion that we should favor “sufficiency-constrained
luck egalitarianism” because it will allow “some inequalities in outcome may arise justly but
deny that individuals’ [can have] less than enough” even when it is voluntary 25. Luck
egalitarianism “insists that it is unjust for some individuals to be worse off than others through
no choice of their own but denies that inequalities are unjust when produced by variations in
voluntary choice against a background of equal opportunity” 26. As a result, Casal does find
something intrinsically valuable about equality, but it is only right to pursue in situations where
there has been an injustice done. Yet she does not fall victim to the Leveling Down Objection
that Parfit poses because she will not correct inequalities unless there was a voluntary choice
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made. Even then, she believes there is an absolute social minimum that we can allow people to
fall to even with poor choices.
Casal comes to the conclusion that sufficientarianism cannot stand up on its own. By
itself, Casal argues that Sufficientarianism does not do enough for equality above and below the
threshold, and the theory can only supplement other disruptive justice theories like luck
egalitarianism.

14

Chapter Two: Revising Sufficientarianism

Picking up from Chapter One, we have just reviewed potential problems of
sufficientarianism. Specifically, we looked at two main types of problems with the theory–
problems with scarcity and problems with abundance. Scarcity problems deal with distribution
below the line of sufficiency and abundance problems deal with above the line of sufficiency.
Our goal for chapter two is create our own working theory as to what sufficientarianism is, so we
can get the best form of sufficientarianism to answer these problems.

What do Sufficientarians Care About?
Before stepping into the problems and potential solutions of sufficientarianism, we return
to the roots of the theory. We should understand why sufficientarianism came up as a theory of
distributive justice, what the theory intended to respond to, and whether current theories
proposed versions of sufficientarianism do what they intended.
To explore this particular issue, we will look at Casal’s objection that she terms “The
Choice between Possible Units of Concern” 27. I prefer to think about this issue as the “What do
Sufficientarians Care About” topic because it addresses what sufficientarianism is supposed to be
measuring as success, and thus valuing at the end of the day. Casal’s objection in her three
people, Ana, Bea and Celia case. Casal argues that Ana (who can’t reach sufficiency even with
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surgery) is written off via “a principle requiring the minimization of insufficiency does not
provide any reason to operate”28.
On Ana’s issue, Casal believes that sufficientarianism cannot do anything to better her
condition because she will never reach sufficiency. Her view is that sufficientarianism measures
success through a “minimization of insufficiency”, and so helping someone like Ana doesn’t do
anything29. Giving Ana more resources won’t create another person over the sufficiency
threshold. Casal’s view of sufficientarianism has a measure of success where we are best off
when the most people are over the sufficiency threshold.
Frankfurt’s view of sufficientarianism is rather non-descriptive. At its core, Frankfurt
hopes to use sufficientarianism to “repair a society in which many have far too little” 30. Thus, he
believes “our basic focus should be on reducing both poverty” 31. It seems doubtful that the
correct way to interrupt this is to say that if someone cannot achieve sufficiency or be pulled out
of poverty in his view, we will not distribute any more resources to them. What Frankfurt does
imply, is that he does not believe that egalitarian considerations matter below the line of
sufficiency. This is why in his medicine case, he is willing to distribute more medicine to certain
people over others. He has not forgotten about the other people that have not reached sufficiency,
but rather is focusing on the ones that he can guarantee sufficiency at that moment. Does
Frankfurt’s view still care about giving resources to people even without the guarantee of
sufficiency? On this matter, Frankfurt claims that “that it is never or only rarely beneficial to
move closer to an important utility threshold without actually crossing it. It may certainly be
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beneficial, either because it increases the likelihood that the threshold will ultimately be crossed,
or because—quite apart from the significance of crossing the threshold— additional resources
may provide desirable increments of utility” 32. So, yes, even when a person will not immediately
reach sufficiency, we should still distribute resources to them in the hopes that eventually they
will reach sufficiency. Additionally, even apart from that reaching sufficiency altogether, a
person with more resources closer to the line of sufficiency has a higher level of utility, and thus
is better off. Greater suffering is the enemy in Frankfurt’s view, and any resources that can be
distributed to get someone close to sufficiency to alleviate suffering is still something that his
form of sufficientarianism cares about.
Crisp uses compassion as a metric for distributing resources. He uses his compassion
principle which states “absolute priority is to be given to benefits to those below the threshold at
which compassion enters. Below the threshold, benefiting people matters more the worse off
those people are, the more of those people there are, and the greater the size of the benefit in
question”33. As a result, prioritarian and utilitarian considerations play into how he decides
things are distributed below the line of sufficiency. We give things to people who are lower from
the threshold because we feel more compassion for those people who are suffering more or for
great groups of suffering. Casal commends Crisp’s incorporation of prioritarian consideration
stating that “Ana’s case shows why sufficientarians should, as Crisp recognizes, incorporate
prioritarian considerations within their overall view” 34. Similar to Frankfurt, Crisp doesn’t
outright state what he views success under his form of sufficientarianism would be, but he does
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use the compassion principle to further prioritarian considerations. This position for Crisp would
mean that he would also want people to be as well off as possible, close to the line of sufficiency.
While both Frankfurt and Crisp want people to get close to the line of sufficiency, and
then achieve sufficiency, the key distinction between Frankfurt and Crisp is that Frankfurt does
not believe in extra considerations below the line of sufficiency. Crisp advocates in bringing
people up with the Compassion Principle which takes these prioritarian and utilitarian
considerations into play. Crisp would advocate that we help give resources below the line of
sufficiency to the people we feel most compassion for. For Frankfurt, he is most concerned with
issues of extreme scarcity – issues where not everyone will achieve sufficiency or even an
increase in sufficiency in the long run, and what will ensure some people get sufficiency is an
uneven distribution of resources. What Frankfurt’s version of sufficientarianism seems to care
about is long-term increases in utility. Frankfurt agrees it is reasonable to assign a higher priority
to give additional resources to people below the threshold, but argues that simply giving people
resources below the threshold “may not actually improve the condition of those people at all” 35.
The assumption Frankfurt has made in this statement is that some people cannot be helped by
additional amounts of resources. As such, we would be better to distribute resources elsewhere,
not because we do not care about these people, but because giving them any more resources
would not move them closer to sufficiency.
In light of considering what sufficientarians care about, it’s important to remember the
motivation for creating the theory in the first place. As Frankfurt is considered the ‘father’ of
modern-day sufficientarianism, he is perhaps the most influential philosopher in setting the
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origins for the theory. Sufficientarianism is a response to egalitarianism, fighting the narrative
that “our most fundamental challenge is not the fact that the incomes of Americans are widely
unequal”, but that the most pressing challenge is that “too many of our people are poor” 36. In
addition, Frankfurt finds it “indisputably” that the extremely wealthy have “a great deal more
than they need in order to live active, productive, and comfortable lives” 37. Gluttony has its own
harmful effects, including “harmful psychological and moral effects upon the lives of the
gluttons themselves”38. Poverty and gluttony are two sides of a coin where a person either has
too much or too little resources. Both are a bad because they cause suffering for the person who
is affected as well as society at large. Thus, the motivation of sufficientarianism is two-fold:
relieve greater suffering through reducing gluttony and poverty.
How did this line of reasoning, that is – greater suffering excess wealth and excess wealth
are the enemy, lead us to sufficientarianism? What sufficientarianism seems to suggest is that at
some point, sufficiency can be reached so that a person is no longer considered impoverished.
Below this line, we, as a society of resource distributors, have a special obligation to help people
who have not met this sufficiency level. When people are no longer impoverished, their choices
(in combination with luck) determine how well-off they are. Under sufficientarian theory, as
long as a person is not suffering from poverty or excess gluttony, people can control to a large
degree how well-off they are. This is a major distinction between egalitarian and prioritarian
theories where the goal is focused on closing gaps between groups of people. Sufficientarianism
recognizes that people will make their own choices, and the resulting consequences should be
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theirs to bear. People have a personal responsibility to manage their own resources, but they also
have the freedom to be as well-off as they would like as long as they are hoarding unnecessarily.
To see the appeal of sufficientarianism in this regard, we can imagine two siblings, Dan
and Ellie, who have taken very different life paths. Dan has always worked hard, and as a result,
he does well for himself. Dan’s luck hasn’t been perfect, for example, his house was hit quite
harshly after a bad storm. However, Dan chose to buy insurance, and insurance, when available,
allows Dan to have a safety net that otherwise would be left to brute risks. Ellie, on the other
hand, has enjoyed her leisure time, and so she has many fewer resources since she does not
devote as much time to work. This is her choice, and she has willingly made this trade-off. As
sufficientarianism, we are just concerned that neither one suffers as a result from poverty or
excess gluttony. Unless a person is really in great poverty or hoarding resources gluttonously, we
have no responsibility to insert ourselves into how other people use their resources.
Unfortunately, I think this is where both Frankfurt, and Crisp fail in their versions of
sufficientarianism. A person who hoards resources situation should be taken as seriously as a
person who lacks resources. There is a line of sufficiency in both Frankfurt’s and Crisp’s
versions of sufficientarianism where the people below the line are considered to have not
enough. These are the people to who we have a special obligation to give resources. But, if we
want to combat gluttony, we also must think about who we are taking resources from. Is
everyone above this line of sufficiency, on a level of gluttony, where we should take resources
from them? Most likely, not. There must exist a space between having too few resources and
having too many resources. But under both accounts of their sufficientarianism, a person will
always fall on one side of the sufficiency threshold, making them a giver or a taker of resources.
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The sufficiency line suggests this, that there is a shift as soon as that line is crossed, and that a
person no longer becomes ‘in need’ and now becomes someone who helps bring people up to the
line of sufficiency. Casal notes this as odd when talking about sufficientarianism theories that
only support one threshold for the reason that “it is strange to think that individuals can suddenly
plummet from having absolute priority to no priority whatsoever”39. I would add that it may
even be stranger than Casal believes because our theory of distributive justice is not just about
giving resources, but about taking them to redistribute them as well. Any theory of distributive
justice must consider where resources that can distributed be are coming from, and the most
obvious answer is in the form of taxation. So a person who has crossed the line jumps from
absolute priority in receiving to absolute priority in giving.
This leaves us with a theory where neither proposed version of sufficientarianism really
leaves room for people that are in cases where having just enough is a plausible position. While
the goal of sufficientarianism is to reach sufficiency, the goal is not to reach sufficiency and then
more. If a person gets to a point where they have enough resources, and then continues to collect
resources to the point of hoarding, this goes against sufficientarians trying to reduce gluttony.
There should be an area in which people who have more resources so they are not impoverished
or demand our compassion, but they do not have too many resources so that they have exhibited
greediness. Sufficientarianism is about aiming for this area of sufficiency. Having a single line of
sufficiency signifies not only are the people that cross it sufficient, but now these people have
too much.
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One of the problems with sufficientarianism that Casal identifies is that there are
problems with both a high threshold and a low threshold sufficiency. Casal argues that on one
hand, thresholds that are too low may serve little purpose and lead to big gaps above the line of
sufficiency, but on the other hand, thresholds that are too high may, ironically, lead to move
people being left behind. To demonstrate why too low thresholds may be a bad idea, imagine a
threshold set at some low level. Because it is lower, people can meet sufficiency with ease.
However, once they do, it is no longer a problem if any relevant disparities exist. After all, we
only care that sufficiency has been met, and poverty eliminated, not that some people are ultrarich and some are just barely out of poverty. As for high thresholds, we return to Frankfurt’s
example of 10 patients needing medicine. If we have a particularly high threshold, so that we
have to “maximize the number of people who have enough”, we might be forced to invest “all
the resources available in just one individual so that she reaches a threshold”, and “thereby
allowing nine deaths”40. A high threshold means it is harder to reach sufficiency, and if we
measure success by minimizing insufficiency, then we may leave people behind so that a few can
reach the very high threshold.
With our reasoning for becoming sufficientarians, neither low nor high thresholds seem
appropriate. Low thresholds may set a goal so that no one faces resource poverty, but they treat
people with just enough resources and people with excessive resources the same. High thresholds
may make it so the people that are giving the resources are those above the threshold, and
therefore those who truly have enough; but, even if we ignore Casal’s idea of minimizing
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insufficiency and focus on Crisp’s idea of compassion (and by extension prioritarian
considerations), we still treat people who likely have enough as a taker of a resource.
At its core, having a single line of sufficiency does not properly do what
sufficientarianism intended to do. If we care about preventing two things (poverty and gluttony),
then we put limits, so that people stay in a certain range of resources where their own choices
will determine where they fall. These limits are the thresholds of sufficientarianism where either
above or below, we have a motive to intervene (see Figure 1) 41. This sufficientarianism focuses
on two thresholds where each threshold has its own goal. The bottom threshold’s goal is to be a
marker of where poverty is. This bottom-limit works to ensure a person can have enough
resources, and is our ‘minimum standard of living’. At the bottom-limit, people should be able to
afford the basic necessities for a modest daily life. The upper threshold’s goal is to ensure that
people don’t hoard resources unnecessarily or live lives of excess glamor while others live in
poverty.
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Figure 1: Two Threshold Version of Sufficientarianism

To return to Casal’s three person case, I do not question why she worries about Ana as
she is below the line of sufficiency. However, neither the best version of sufficientarianism
would not advocate for ignoring someone just because they would have a hard time reaching
sufficiency. Making sure poverty is alleviated, even if it is not eliminated is a part of
sufficientarianism. However, I do wonder why Casal also worries about Bea. While Casal pities
Bea because Bea has lived a “barely good enough” life, I think Casal is phrasing Bea’s life in a
way that we would have sympathy for Bea42. Casal has, by her own account, put Bea over a
sufficiency threshold, albeit by a slim margin, but to the point where her life has been reasonably
good. Casal compares Bea to Celia, and concerns that any extra luxury treatment that we give to
Celia will only further the divide between the two. However, this is where Casal has
misunderstood sufficientarianism. Sufficientarianism is not about Bea, a perfectly content
person, versus Celia, a person who has an excessive amount of stuff. Sufficientarianism is about
Ana, a person with far too little, versus Celia. Bea is the overlooked person with ‘just enough’
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that she should not be a taker nor a receiver of resources. Under the new proposed two-threshold
version of sufficientarianism, Bea would likely be above the bottom threshold by Casal’s
remarks. As a result, she would not get special treatment or resources. Nor would Celia, who
may be above the upper threshold, and could be expected to contribute resources.
If what sufficientarians care about is making sure people have some range of enough that
is a resource amount so that people can cohabitate without living in poverty or in excess, then the
current working theories have not created an area for these people to exist. Where current
sufficientarianism fails is that it only provides two spaces for people to exist: above the threshold
and below the threshold. Each space suggests a different thing that the theory is against. Being
above the threshold suggests that one must give resources to reduce excess. Being below the
threshold suggests one must receive resources to reduce poverty. Yet if poverty and excess are
always being reduced, then there is no neutral zone where people can simply have enough. By
creating a two-threshold version to combat poverty and gluttony, we allow for people to make
their own choices with their resources.
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Chapter 3: Group Responsibilities and Problems

Now that we have outlined our new version of sufficientarianism, it seems appropriate to
take a look at what responsibilities each group will take on as a form of restorative justice.
Our new theory of sufficientarianism gives us three ‘areas’, each area representing
something different. The area below both thresholds, the lowest tier, is the area where people are
suffering from poverty, and do not have enough resources to be considered ‘sufficient’. The area
between the lower-threshold and upper-threshold, which we may refer to as the middle tier, is
where people have gathered ‘enough’ resources, and personal choice will determine where they
fall. The area above both these thresholds, or the highest tier of resources, is the area of gluttony,
where people hold so many resources that it in some way prohibits people beneath the upperthreshold from gathering more resources. In this chapter, we will explore what responsibilities
each group faces, specifically with regards to resources redistribution and taxation, and potential
critiques how each area is dealt with.

Problems with Sufficiency
We turn first towards people in the middle tier, who are sufficiently well off. This area is
not one discussed by Casal as both Frankfurt and Crisp fashioned versions of sufficientarianism
that only had two areas (above or below a single threshold). Nonetheless, we should explore this
area for potential problems after stating the responsibilities of the group.
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In our new theory, the individuals in the middle tier are responsible for taxation for public
goods, but not for resources redistribution. In this area, people have been determined to have
‘enough’ resources, so taking away resources or giving resources for the purposes of
redistribution is counterintuitive. We would still tax this group, but for reasons of public goods. .
Public goods are a type of good that are non-excludable and non-rivalrous, meaning that the use
of the good by one person does not exclude the use of the good by another and providing the
good does not reduce the amount of the good. As a result, public goods are under produced
without the assistance of a supervising body. Additionally, public goods tend to benefit most
people, so while there are taxes on this group to create such types of goods, the ultimate benefit
is for the group. The second group has sufficiently acquired enough resources so that personal
choice is should be the determinate of where a person lands in the second area. However, giving
back resources for redistribution amongst the population is slightly different from the matter of
taxation for creating public goods. While all groups will benefit from the creation of public
goods, not all groups can contribute to the creation. Therefore, we as a society only ask that
groups with ‘enough’ resources, contribute to something that would be a beneficial collective
project.
Of course, the issue of taxation brings up Casal’s negative thesis, the idea that
sufficientarianism must treat everyone above a threshold the same. However, in this case, we do
not have to treat people with the same regards to taxation responsibilities. As Casal, herself
admits, the positive and the negative thesis do not have to invoke the same threshold 43. Our
lower threshold raises the idea that everyone should have enough to live a life free from poverty,
but it is our upper threshold that places the cut off where egalitarian and prioritarian
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considerations no longer have any considerations. The reason for doing this sort of taxation
policy is that although personal choice should be the determinate of where a person falls in this
area, we still place a slightly higher priority on making sure people towards the lower-threshold
do not fall below the lower threshold entirely. While they carry some responsibility for
contributing to public goods, taking away too many resources diminishes their well-being
potentially at an increased rate due to laws of diminishing marginal utility. A progressive tax
system best implements a fair system that puts the burden equally on all people. This is in
counter to a system when people would be taxes either a resource amount or resource percent.
Here, while things might be ‘equal’ the burden of the tax is not equal on every single person. To
imagine this further, think of a 10% tax on someone with a lower resource level versus a higher
resource level. While the 10% is proportional to their wealth, it does not affect the two people
the same. The wealthier individual can bear the burden much easier than the lower income
individual relative to their utility level. Therefore the system that we would want to implement
would be one that most progressive counties (including the United States) have in place.. The
resource level that a person in the middle tier has is taxed in a bracket system, and each tax rate
applies only to the level of resources in that tax bracket. So a person at the top of the middle tier
pays the corresponding tax rates for their resource level until they reach a new bracket. At the
highest bracket, they pay the highest tax, but only on the level of resources that has put them at
that bracket. Essentially, people on the lower end of the area are more sensitive to changes in
their resource level because taking away an additional resource from them impacts them greater
than taking away an additional resource from someone higher up. Therefore, we tax these
individuals at a progressive rate for the purposes of supporting public goods.
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However, besides the taxation for the creation of public goods, we treat everyone in this
group the same. No one has a duty to contribute resources for the purpose of redistribution. By
doing this, we acknowledge that citizens assume responsibility for the management of their own
resources, and can use those resources in whatever ways see fit to fulfill their preferences.
Inequalities will naturally rise out of how people differ in spending or saving resources, and the
job of a supervising body is not to correct for trivial differences when everyone is living above a
poverty standard. The choices of how one person spends their resources should reflect on them,
and not on other people. As a result, if a person falls in resource level we should not expect other
people to compensate them for the choices that lead them to this position. More importantly
though, we should not dedicate resources to helping people who are already above the lower
level poverty line when we can help people below the lower level poverty line. Our concern is
guaranteeing everyone a resource minimum. Of course, this will apply if any person falls below
the lower threshold, and we will guarantee that they are returned to the minimum threshold. But
our concern is guaranteeing that everyone can be at the lower threshold.
Naturally, this guaranteed social minimum may some criticism. While Casal actually
finds the idea of a social minimum positive, and thinks that “few deny that the elimination of
certain types of deprivation, such as hunger or disease, [and many] … accept Rawls’s view that a
just society will guarantee a social minimum”, our view goes further than simply just eliminating
deprivation44. The lower-level threshold is meant to eliminate poverty altogether which means
that it would ensure that people have access to things needed to function in daily lives
(comfortable shelter, transportation, etc). If we guarantee this, we guarantee it to people
regardless of their situation, and some critics may argue people could choose to not work at all
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and live off of this guaranteed minimum. While this is a possibility and some people may take it,
personally, I believe it is sad way to look at humanity. Furthermore, while no empirical studies
have been done to prove such the hypothesis that most people would continue to work, case
studies have looked at how people react when a universal basic income is enacted. The closest
case study comes “from 1974 to 1979 when the Canadian government partnered with the
province of Manitoba” and “guaranteed annual income offered to every eligible family in
Dauphin… and smaller numbers of residents in Winnipeg” 45. The area continued to thrive, and
for “primary earners — those with full-time jobs — there was virtually no decline in work” 46.
While we do not have a social minimum guaranteed in the United States, we have lots of social
programs that could theoretically allow people to do little work, and live off of government
assistance. Thus it would seem, most people choose not to take this route of full leisure, probably
because they want more resources than would be guaranteed at the lowest point. If their utility
can increase with extra resources and leisure has diminishing marginal returns for most people,
then working would be the best way to increase utility.
While the middle tier has taxation responsibilities, we also have responsibilities to this
tier as well. It is important not only to guarantee sufficiency, but to continue to this guarantee.
Although this may be a small concern for this tier, ensuring that the positive thesis is held, so that
everyone does has enough at all times, and no one falls below the bottom threshold is part of the
responsibility of sufficientarianism.
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Problems with Abundance
The first group that we will look at is the individuals that fall into upper-tier. As we saw
in Chapter One, after the line of sufficiency has been passed, sufficientarians argue that no
prioritarian or egalitarian distributive requirements should apply. In our new two-threshold
version of sufficientarianism, we will only consider those who have passed the top tier to have an
overabundance of resources. Thus, these individuals will be treated slightly differently in terms
of resource burdens than people in the middle tier who only have ‘enough’ resources. Groups
over the upper threshold have a burden to redistribute their resources because they have collected
too many resources that it affects their well-being as well as the well-being of others who now
are heavily restricted in the amount of resources they can collect. The idea that we would be
indifferent to treatment to groups above the upper threshold was seen as a weak point by Casal as
inequalities above this line, in her mind, still have the possibility to constitute an injustice.
Casal argues that it is not just that sufficientarians are indifferent “to inequalities among
millionaires and billionaires”, but that they are indifferent to inequalities of people who have
barely enough and billionaires47. In our two-threshold verison of sufficientarianism, this is no
longer the case. People who have just enough will fall above a different threshold from people
who have exorbitant amounts of money. As a result, they will be quite treated differently in
terms of their taxation responsibilities. However, it does still hold under our new two-threshold
theory sufficientarianism that within the upper tier, individuals will be treated the same as other
group members.
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One critique Casal provides for individuals on the highest tier is that these individuals
will be treated the same in regards to taxation because sufficientarianism “cannot support the
preference for progressive over regressive taxes”48. Casal never says why in particular she
prefers progressive taxes though it can be inferred that she worries that people just above the
sufficiency line and people well above the sufficiency line have the same responsibilities under
sufficientarianism. She believes that progressive taxes cannot be applied above the threshold
because they suggest once you have enough, egalitarian and prioritaian considerations still
matter. It is worth considering if progressive taxes may not be the right thing for people above
the upper sufficiency threshold.
Consider how a sufficientarian would tax above the line of sufficiency. Since
sufficientarians are theoretically indifferent to the inequalities above the threshold, the same tax
policy should be implemented on everyone. One way they might choose to implement the same
tax system is with a flat dollar amount tax. Sufficientarians might choose to tax everyone above
the line of sufficiency a $50,000 tax. This would likely be regressive as people with smaller
income, closer to the line of sufficiency would pay a higher percentage of their income in taxes
versus people who were way above sufficiency. Another way sufficientarians could tax people is
by charging everyone a flat percent tax of 30% of their income per month. If a person has
reached sufficiency, they are expected to contribute a portion back to helping others reaching
sufficiency, and everyone is burdened by the same percent on their income. The last way
sufficientarians could tax people is taxing people’s level of well-being. Since the loss of money
does not have the same effect on everyone’s utility, we could find a way to calculate how losing
a certain amount of money on a very wealthy person versus a person just above the threshold
48
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impacts their well-being. The tax would go after make sure each person had an equal amount of
utility lost. Though this last idea is much more abstract, it still treats everyone the same. People
above the upper sufficiency threshold would lose resources at an equal rate relative to their
utility.
Before I get into what I think is the correct way to deal with resources redistribution
policy above the upper line of sufficiency, I want to more directly respond to Casal’s argument.
My belief is that sufficientarianism should incorporate a high upper threshold into the theory, so
it is the wealthiest individuals, those with an overabundance of resources, who have to deal with
this resource redistribution. A sufficientarianism theory with a higher upper threshold avoid
problems between people who have barely enough and people with lots of resources because the
higher a threshold becomes, the less we care about differences in responsibilities between
trillionaires and billionaires.
This returns us to resources redistribution responsibilities. If we have set a high upper
threshold such that only those who really have more than ‘enough’ – people who have money
and are not concerned about it then a flat tax is best. To understand why, we return to our
sufficientarian theory, and Frankfurt who states that the most “basic focus [of sufficientarianism]
should be on reducing both poverty and excessive affluence” 49. We should tax people above the
sufficiency threshold, those who hold a gluttonous amount, a high flat tax in order to redistribute
it, and move people closer to the line of sufficiency. Regardless of how people above the upperthreshold acquired their resources, they now have an over-abundance of resources which is
inherently a bad thing. This group has accumulated so much wealth that they are at a resource
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surplus level, and owe it to the larger society to redistribute resources back because their
congregation of wealth is somehow preventing others from accessing more wealth. These
individuals hold a responsibility as members of a productive society to be a part of a
redistributive policy. It does not make sense that every single person would contribute to a
redistribution policy in the same way because people have varying levels of resources. Our
upper-threshold is set so high in part because people who have met this level, while they may
have varying levels of resources, have such high levels of varying resources that a very high flat
resource tax impacts them all in very similar ways. In terms of pure resources distribution, it is
only the top-tier group that will have to give back resources for the purposes of redistribution.
Perhaps this logic seems counterintuitive given that I have just explained that a
progressive tax system should be placed on the middle tier. To clarify why I think this is not a
logical inconsistency, I should add that even people in the upper-tier are treated like people in the
middle tier in the progressive tax system until they reach the highest threshold. This means all of
the wealth that they have accumulated will be taxed in the same system as anyone in the middle
tier until the wealth reaches the upper-bracket. At this point, we treat all individual wealth the
same. The progressive tax system is still in place, but it has the last bracket defined by a flat tax
on wealth over the upper threshold. The reason for instituting this sort of tax bracket is that at
some point we must have the final tax bracket. We cannot have tax brackets going on for
infinity. At some point, we create a line where over this wealth limit, you are expected to pay a
high tax and no more brackets occur.
Some critics may take issue with this line of arguing. While we have successfully dealt
with Casal who had problems with people who have barely enough and billionaires, we now
would have a system in place where multi-millionaires and billionaires are treated the same.
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Some people may want an even more progressive system that further divides wealth among these
individuals. It may be compelling to further divide wealthy people, so that the more endowed are
paying even higher rates of taxes. However, if we believe in sufficientarianism, then we are
inclined to believe that the problem is poverty, not wealth, and discussions that would compare
ultra-wealthy people become distracting. For the people that would disagree, I would urge they
read the reasons we turned to sufficientarianism in the first place. If we reasoned our version of
sufficientarianism to be the right theory, then it should follow that the implications of the theory
are also right. One implication, in this case, is that above a certain threshold, we treat people the
same because we have decided that discussions regarding excess wealth lead to people
comparing their wealth status with others and jealousy rather than real progress 50.
This sort of giving back is not a punishment, but rather the responsibility of the group
that has congregated the most resources. It should be considered that some sort of exorbitantly
high flat wealth tax might help everyone, including the people above the upper-threshold. As
previously stated, when resources congregate in the hands of the wealthiest individuals, they tend
to not be productive resources. Without ‘freeing up’ resources, there is “lower investment in
education and health, [which ultimately] impairs long-term growth” 51. Enabling term economic
growth in the long-run by freeing up resources is something that benefits everyone.
Simultaneously, allowing the wealthiest individuals to keep most (but not gluttonous amounts of
resources), “endows the rich with the means to start businesses, and creates incentives to increase
productivity and investment, promoting economic activity” 52. The allowed levels of differing
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levels of resources is a benefit of sufficientarianism because some level inequality promotes
economic growth, but our two-threshold version puts a loose restraint in the form of taxation on
the extreme resource amass, ensuring that inequality does not get too out of hand.
At this point, a flat tax is instituted for all people above the upper-threshold. People who
have passed this threshold have accumulated so much wealth that the best thing to do is tax them
all at a very high rate. When this threshold has been passed, egalitarian and prioritarian
considerations do not come into play because our concern is that these people have gotten too
wealthy in comparison with everyone else. There is no need to treat people above the upperthreshold as people who have committed different offensives. They have all hoarded too many
resources, and the construction of a high flat tax for people of a very high wealth category
signals that it does not matter how much surplus of resources a person has. The mere fact that
anyone has a surplus is what is the bad thing and what the high flat tax attempts to get rid of.
Critics might argue that a flat tax for the wealthiest group is still controversial. After all,
if gluttony is bad shouldn’t have more resources, and therefore are more gluttonous by hoarding
more resources have to face a higher tax? While this logic might be appealing at first, it would
also suggest that less gluttony is somehow better. If I hoard resources at a high level, but I do it
at just a smaller scale than someone else who hoards way more resources than me, shouldn’t I
face a smaller tax because I have committed a smaller crime? The answer is, no. Here, taxation is
used as a form of restorative justice for people who have collected too many resources. Gluttony
or the hoarding of resources is not something that is ‘less bad’ or ‘more good’ when people
decide to hoard less. The wrongdoing is still the same, albeit on a smaller scale, but simply
because it was done less does not make it less wrong.
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When we return to our theory, we see also that sufficientarianism would not promote
progressive policies between the very wealthy and the very very wealthy. Both groups deserve to
face a high redistribution tax. If things start becoming about “who owes more”, then things stop
becoming about “how can we help reduce poverty”. Discussions about excess wealth are
misleading because they move the debate away from more helpful poverty policies. If we
institute progressive taxes, then we signal that we care about the difference in resource level with
people who have too much. But this is not what we care about. What we care about is just that
people have too many resources to begin with compared to people who have far too little. No
matter where a person who has reached the upper threshold falls, they have an excess of
resources.
As this group is the best-off in terms of resources, we hold them accountable for
contributing to the redistribution of resources and the taxation for public goods. The wealth that
they contribute back goes, in part, to help people below the lowest-threshold, and also, in part, to
the creation of public goods. Intuitively, it makes sense that the group most endowed with
resources has the most responsibilities in terms of taxation and resource redistribution. The group
has these responsibilities because they are not just better off, but because they are substantially
better off. Taking away resources from them is done to benefit everyone, this top tier included
who will profit from economic growth that occurs when unused resources are freed up.

Problems with Scarcity
Finally, we will look at the group below both thresholds. This group has no responsibility
to give back resources for taxation or redistribution purposes. While they do benefit from public
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goods created from taxation, the group is at a level of resources that has been deemed not
sufficient for living a comfortable life where basic needs are met. As a result of their
impoverished state, taking resources would be an unnecessary burden and would send them
further into a state of poverty. Since our responsibility is to get people closer and then reach
sufficiency, we would be counteracting this idea if we put a tax on people that haven’t yet met
sufficiency. Rather, we will distribute resources to this group with the means that more resources
will increase levels of well-being, and move people closer to the lower threshold. It seems
doubtful that people would argue that people in poverty should – or even somehow can –
redistribute resources as a group so that they no longer in poverty. Being beneath both
thresholds, the first group suffers from having not enough resources so taxing them would be
taking away resources from a group that has not yet gotten enough to comfortably meet their
basic needs.
While this group has straightforward responsibilities, it does not leave us without
potential problems for the group, specifically our responsibilities to this group. We have
determined that this group does not have a role in giving resources, but they still have to receive
resources which means we have to determine how to best distribute resources, especially in cases
of scarcity when not enough resources exist for everyone below the threshold.
In order to consider this issue, we will reexamine Frankfurt’s medicine example where
not enough medicine existed to get everyone to the point of sufficiency. Frankfurt argued that
sufficientarianism would be the best theory for distribution because it would ensure that that five
patients would achieve sufficiency whereas egalitarianism would just split the medicine equally.
Casal, on the other hand, disagreed saying that egalitarianism was only committed to finding a
fair way to distribute the resource without destroying the benefit. One important issue that
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sufficientarians face, Casal argues, is that sufficientarians have no way “to employ a fair way of
selecting the lucky five [patients]”53. In order to secure sufficiency, Casal argues that
sufficientarianism leaves behind factors like fairness, and overlooks otherwise important factors
like the patient’s age.
Sufficientarianism requires that individuals reach sufficiency. Casal’s objection to this,
specifically in Frankfurt’s medicine case is that it doesn’t matter who reaches sufficiency. People
can be unfairly favored because sufficientarianism doesn’t have any mechanism for fairly
distributing resources below the sufficiency threshold. Once again, the question arises of what
does reaching the sufficiency threshold mean arises. In our two-threshold version of
sufficientarianism, it is not the elimination of equality that we care about to get to the lower
level. However, returning to the theory that got us to the two- threshold version
sufficientarianism, we might consider what reaching the lower threshold represents.
In a direct sense, reaching the lower threshold denotes having enough resources to have
avoided poverty. But in an indirect sense, it also represents reaching an area where an individual
has ‘enough’ and is not missing any basic needs. While basic needs may include tangible things
like water, food and shelter, they also include intangible things like freedom, access to
knowledge, or fair treatment. Consider a person who has plentiful resources, but restricted
personal freedom. Have they really met sufficiency? Although they are well-off in one sense,
they have been restricted in another which also affects their well-being. Lower level-sufficiency
requires these intangible basic needs, just as much as it requires tangible basic needs. We have
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not snuck in any extra principles to sufficientarianism, rather we have considered what it takes to
be sufficient.
In this case, we are taking a special look at the intangible basic need of fairness. It seems
intuitive to conclude that without fair treatment a person cannot be treated sufficiently, and thus
reach the threshold. Fairness invokes a set of objectivity that we treat everyone with respect to
their personal features. In this regard, fairness opposes equality because we treat people
differently because of qualities that make them unique. When Casal suggests that we the age of
the patient in Frankfurt’s medicine case, we are considering people in an unequal way. However,
if we weigh them by their age so the young are more likely to get the medicine, then we are
treating them in a fair way such that everyone has the fair chance to get have lived a long life.
Sufficiency requires this kind of fair treatment because without it, a fundamental intangible basic
need is missing. Someone who is continuously wronged, and treated unfairly, regardless of their
resource amount, cannot be considered at a level of sufficiency.
So how exactly do we distribute resources under the line of sufficiency? Casal argues that
sufficientarians are in favor of a forum of the theory that minimizes insufficiency. This means, in
her mind, sufficientarians want the least number of people to be insufficient. As a result, some
people make get left behind at incredibly low resource levels so that others can meet our lower
threshold, and it would seem, that she gets this idea from Frankfurt’s medicine case. Obviously,
Frankfurt has chosen to leave some individuals at a low resource level so that others can meet
sufficiency in this example. However, as Casal herself admits egalitarianism would do something
similar, at least in this example. As we saw in Chapter Two, when egalitarians are forced into a
similar life or death situation, they also distribute benefits, so resources are not wasted, but just
give everyone a fair chance to receive that benefit. As I have stated just now, I believe in order to
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be sufficient, being treated fairly is one of the intangible principles that is required. Ultimately, in
this specific medicine example, things are a bit different from a regular threshold example.
Because the stakes are life or death rather than poverty or sufficiency, we may see a different set
of rules play out such that in situations of life or death things do become about minimizing
insufficiency because in these cases insufficiency is equitable with death. And maybe that’s
okay, such that the rules are a bit different.
As always, we return to the roots of the theory to see why such a discrepancy may exist.
One of Frankfurt’s key arguments in making sufficientarianism was that while “it is never or
only rarely beneficial to move [an individual] closer to an important utility threshold without
actually crossing it”, it may be unbeneficial to “additional resources to people who… are in
serious need”54. And at first, this seems really odd. How could it ever be unbeneficial to give
resources to people who are really in need? But again, remember what we saw Frankfurt say in
Chapter Two which is that giving more resources “may not actually improve the condition of
those people at all”55. So if an individual cannot be helped with more resources, we do not give
them more resources. Why? Because, with the same resources we can help other people. In some
sense, this is about minimizing insufficiency because we, of course, do want the maximum
number of people to be sufficient, and for the people that are helped by additional resources, we
give them that. However, if a person is unable to be bettered by resources, there is nothing that a
theory of distributive resources can do to help them. And at that point, again, we are best off to
put our resources elsewhere.
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To some critics, this conclusion will be unsatisfying. After all, we are leaving people
below the line of sufficiency. To those people, I remind you, at some point, we cannot do
anything to help everybody. No theory of distributive justice will leave people when there aren’t
enough resources satisfied. This is what we saw in Frankfurt’s medicine case. The resource level
was too low to satisfy everyone, so what we needed was a fair way of distributing resources (as
fairness is an intangible basic need). Thus, we have no choice but to leave some people behind,
not out of cruelty, but out of necessity for the other people whose lives we can save.
However, Frankfurt’s medicine case may be an easy example in some ways for problems
with scarcity. While the example ultimately does leave some people unsatisfied, it does so in a
way that few would likely argue against it. After all, giving everyone an equal amount of
medicine would be a waste of resources because no one would be better off in this case. But,
what about it cases where there is a chance for improvement for everyone with some level of
resource, and not everyone can achieve it? To exemplify this, imagine a situation where we have,
instead of ten sick people, ten people underneath a wealth threshold. Each of them needs $80,000
to above a poverty line. We have $400,000 to distribute amongst this population. Once again,
ideally, we would have enough money to distribute to everyone so that this problem would not
arise. But for whatever reason it has arose. Therefore, we are left with two extremes – we can
distribute everything equally and everyone will be $40,000 better off, but no one will be above
the poverty threshold or we can give a select few $80,000, ensuring that some people do reach
sufficiency.
One of the basic principles of sufficientarianism is to ensure that all people ensure
sufficiency. As such, we would be very tempted to choose the second options where people do
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reach sufficiency. However, it is actually the first option that makes the average of the group
closer to sufficiency which is closer to our goal. At first, this may seem impossible, after all, no
matter what we have $400,000 and ten people. So the average amount we can might think we
can better someone is $40,000 regardless of how we split up the money. In order to see why this
is not true, we actually will turn to prioritarianism, Parfit, and an early idea from Chapter One.
Recall the idea that the Priority View was built on, that is, “benefiting people matters more the
worse off these people are”56. By helping people who are worse off, we increase the overall wellbeing more.
Another way to see this is to think of a person who has no wealth whatsoever versus a
person who has $20,000. Both people are under the poverty line. However, if we have the option
to give one of them $10,000, the person who would benefit more would be the person with no
resources. Their well-being would increase more than a person who already has some resources.
At first, this may seem in some ways like we have incorporated prioritarianism considerations
into our version of sufficientarianism. But, remember as sufficientarians what we want the most
if to ensure that everyone can reach sufficiency, so a solution where more well-being is the
outcome, is one we would support. We have not incorporated prioritarianism considerations, but
have incorporated some of the logic of prioritarianism into our theory. The logic we are basing
this position off of is that resources have a decreasing marginal value. The difference between a
person’s first dollar and a person’s ten-thousandth dollar is not the same.
By taking this route, we have chosen to do two things. First, we have chosen to maximize
everyone’s chance at sufficiency rather than maximize sufficiency. Once we have distributed the

56

Parfit, Derek. Equality and Priority. p213

43

money, every individual now has more money, and every individual is more likely to reach
sufficiency. Being in poverty bears a lot of hidden costs, one of which is that being poor tends
correlate with having bad credit (or at least worse credit than those better off), meaning that
interest rates are higher on loans or credit cards. If we raise everyone up rather than elevate a
few, than we are maximizing the chances that everyone will reach sufficiency because everyone
now has more resources individually. However, possibly more important, is the second thing we
have done - making sure that the average level of well-being is as high as possible. While
everyone may have the same resource level, people are better off than if the resources had been
distributed unfairly. As we have discussed in this section, it is crucial when dealing with
problems of scarcity to ensure increase utility long-term.
While ideally, there would be enough resources to distribute, scarcity resources may
arise. As a result, we have a responsibility to the bottom tier to distribute resource fairly. Without
both tangible and intangible basic needs being met, people cannot meet the bottom level of
sufficiency.
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Conclusion

When we return to theories of distributive justice more generally, hopefully it can be seen
sufficientarianism is worth defending. The theory is entrenched in a want to divide resources so
poverty is nonexistent still with a freedom in how people choose to spend their resources.
In this paper, we specifically looked at Casal’s objections to Frankfurt’s and Crisp’s
versions of sufficientarianism. She pointed out distributive problems of abundance and scarcity,
and we looked at those accordingly. Rather than defend Frankfurt’s or Crisp’s sufficientarianism,
we went back to the roots of the theory. Frankfurt and Crisp failed in allowing for large wealth
inequalities, allowing people to hoard resources at high levels. Additionally, we clarified the
sufficientarian theory that would require fair (though not equal) treatment as fairness would be
one of the intangible basic needs required to reach sufficiency. As a result, we returned with a
stronger two-threshold version with three tiers.
Focusing on redistributing policies, we looked at responsibilities by tier. Naturally, those
endowed with more resources would be expected to contribute at a level that affected them at the
same marginal level as those with less resources. This would mean they would contribute a
higher amount of resources with a cap at the high threshold level. Outside of this, we guaranteed
a resource minimum at the bottom threshold level where everyone would ideally have above this
amount, and we would work to provide that. We looked at the economic consequences of taxing
the super wealthy at a high level and providing people with enough resources to escape poverty,
and saw these actions were, at worst, neutral, and, at best, incredibly positive.
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We reconsidered the objections to specific sufficientarianism, and sought to reason why
given these objections the theory must be revised. Amendments were expressed and considered
to be a persuasive response to previous oppositions with the theory.
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